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Abstract
Background: Representing one’s own body is often viewed as a basic form of self-awareness. However, little is known about
structural representations of the body in the brain.
Methods and Findings: We developed an inter-manual version of the classical ‘‘in-between’’ finger gnosis task: participants
judged whether the number of untouched fingers between two touched fingers was the same on both hands, or different.
We thereby dissociated structural knowledge about fingers, specifying their order and relative position within a hand, from
tactile sensory codes. Judgments following stimulation on homologous fingers were consistently more accurate than trials
with no or partial homology. Further experiments showed that structural representations are more enduring than purely
sensory codes, are used even when number of fingers is irrelevant to the task, and moreover involve an allocentric
representation of finger order, independent of hand posture.
Conclusions: Our results suggest the existence of an allocentric representation of body structure at higher stages of the
somatosensory processing pathway, in addition to primary sensory representation.
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Introduction
Knowledge about the physical structure of our own body is a
basic form of self-awareness. We know that we have two arms, two
eyes, ten fingers etc. However, there is no consensus, nor much
systematic research, on how such representations of body structure
are formed, and what information they contain. Primary
somatosensory systems, notably touch, code basic features of
sensory events at the skin, such as intensity and frequency. These
are represented in the somatotopic map of primary somatosensory
cortex, which allows stimuli to be localised on the continuous sheet
of the body surface. However, these primary representations do
not contain structural information about the size and number of
body parts themselves. Moreover, the SI representation of the skin
sheet does not respect the body’s true proportions, and decays
rapidly in less than 1 second in the absence of sensory input [1,2].
These properties reflect the needs of online sensory processing, but
make them unsuitable for representing the body itself.
Nevertheless, representation of body structure appears to be an
important feature of higher processing in the somatosensory
pathway. For example, tactile and proprioceptive inputs are
segregated at early stages of somatosensory processing, in areas 3b,
1 and 2 respectively. However, cells in higher areas, notably SII
and area 5 [3,4], respond to both input modalities. By combining
touch and proprioception, the brain can locate body parts in
space, for example in order to orient towards a tactile stimulus
[5,6]. Thus, the brain updates the current position of body parts in
egocentric space as they move. However, the brain also contains a
second kind of spatial information, which we call structural
information, about the location and size of body parts relative to
one another. Examples of such information include, the number
and order of the fingers, the positions of the joints within the limb,
limbs on the trunk etc. The strongest evidence for these Body
Structural Representations comes from neuropsychology.
Thus, patients with autotopagnosia fail to point to specific body
parts in response to instructions, yet can still use these body parts,
and point towards them when they are stimulated. The pattern of
errors often suggests that the patient has lost the ability to
individuate body parts from each other, and organise them relative
to each other: the command ‘‘point to your elbow’’ may produce
vague pointing to the upper or lower part of the arm which cannot
be explained by visuo-motor impairments [7,8]. Autotopoagnosia
also dissociates from more general impairments of visual mental
imagery and is most frequently caused by left parietal damage
[9,10].
Finger agnosia is a more common and more restricted
disturbance of body structural representation. These patients
may have normal primary somatosensory processing, for example
they may detect unseen touch on the fingers. However, they make
errors in identifying which finger is stimulated. The errors mainly
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these had lost their individual identities and ordering. Patients
make fewer errors when the stimulation is seen as well as felt,
ruling out a mere confusion in using of finger names or labels.
Rather, the deficit seems to be in connecting the primary
somatosensory input to a structural description of the order and
layout of body parts. Finally, these patients can order strips of
paper labelled with the names of the fingers. Their verbal and
semantic knowledge about finger identities and order is intact [11],
but finger identity cannot be attached to somatosensory maps. In
summary, individuation and ordering of fingers are not direct
consequences of sensorimotor organisation, but involve specific
mental operations. These have been localised to the left parietal
lobes [12], although performance in finger gnosis tasks may also be
impaired after right parietal damage putatively as a consequence
of attentional deficits rather than body-specific impairments
[13,14]. Importantly, recent neuroimaging studies confirm the
left lateralization. When healthy participants judged the distance
between body parts the left intra-parietal area was activated, in a
region clearly posterior to SI [15].
Here we investigate how somatosensory codes become con-
nected to body structure representation (BSR), by testing
knowledge about tactile stimulation of the fingers in the absence
of vision. Fingers are a salient feature of human body structure,
with rich sensory and motor innervation. The five digits are
arranged in a clear, and normally fixed, sequential order [16]. We
therefore performed four experiments reported aiming to
dissociate structural knowledge about fingers from sensorimotor
representations of finger stimuli and finger movements, and to
reveal how tactile sensory input accesses the BSR.
Our main interest lay in dissociating sensory representations of
touch stimuli from cognitive representations of body structure.
Therefore, we used an intermanual version of the classical in-
between task [12], in which participants were asked to say whether
the distance between the two fingers touched on one hand was the
same as the distance between the two fingers touched on the other
hand. When the same fingers were touched on both hands (‘‘total
homology’’ trials), the answer ‘same’ could be given based on the
homology of sensory representations alone, and the subject did not
need to represent the structure of the hand in order to identify the
untouched in-between fingers, nor compare structure between
the hands. When the fingers touched on the two hands were not
the same (‘‘partial homology’’ and ‘‘no homology’’ trials), sensory
representations are insufficient, and body structural representa-
tions must be used. We therefore compared the accuracy of
performance as a function of the number of fingers in common on
both hands.
In Experiment 2 we aimed to dissociate the time-courses of the
sensory and structural representations involved in the intermanual
in-between task by introducing an intermanual delay during
stimulation. We reasoned that primary sensory codes have
immediate onset, but decay rapidly [1]. Conversely, structural
codes should take time to build up, but should then resist decay.
On this reasoning, we predicted an interaction between delay and
homology factors, with delay benefiting performance more (or
impairing it less) for no homology and partial homology conditions
than for total homology conditions.
Because the intermanual in-between task specifically refers to the
number of digits on each hand, it is difficult to distinguish between
the contributions of body structural description and numerical
coding. Indeed, finger gnosis and number representation are
generally strongly linked [12,17]. To investigate whether our
effects of homology could be due to numerical coding, rather
than body representation, Experiment 3 compared the intermanual
in-between task with an intensity judgement task using the same
stimuli. In the intensity judgement task, participants judged whether
the left or right hand received more intense stimulation: the
identities of the fingers stimulated on each hand, and the number of
fingers in between the fingers stimulated were irrelevant to the
intensity task. If the intensity task showed the same effects of
homology and delay as the intermanual in-between task, this would
suggest that numerical coding is not responsible for the results found
in the intermanual in-between task, and would strengthen the view
that the putative secondary representations were somatic rather
than simply numerical.
Experiment 4 sought to investigate the frame of reference used
in the different trial types of the intermanual in-between task. The
in-between task clearly involves spatial judgement about the
distances between stimulated body parts. However, the nature of
the spatial representation used remains unclear. There are at least
2 possibilities. First, touched locations could be remapped into
egocentric spatial coordinates [6], and inter-digit distances
computed as vectors between these egocentric co-ordinates.
Alternatively, inter-digit distances could be computed in a
representation of the hand which remains the same as the hand’s
position and posture in space are varied. Several studies show
modulations of tactile perception when hand postures are
incongruent [18] compared to when they are congruent. Such
results are taken as evidence that individual tactile inputs are
rapidly remapped according to hand posture in space. We
therefore wanted to assess whether BSRs were modulated by
postural congruence in the same way as individual tactile inputs.
Materials and Methods
Experiment 1 – The Intermanual In-Between Task
Ten subjects (mean age: 20; range: 19–22; 10F) participated
with the approval of UCL ethics committee. Subjects sat blindfold
at a table, with their hands resting palms down on a computer
monitor. Hand outlines on the monitor allowed the experimenter
to standardise hand positions. On each trial, two digits on the left
hand and two on the right hand were designated by colour patches
at corresponding points on the monitor. The experimenter
manually touched each of the four designated finger locations
simultaneously, with a firm touch lasting around 1 s. Touch was
applied to the dorsum of the distal phalanx, immediately proximal
to the fingernail. Particular attention was paid to ensuring that all
the four stimulated fingers were touched at the same time and with
the same pressure. Subjects made unspeeded vocal responses to
indicate whether the number of untouched fingers in between the
two fingers touched was the same or different across the two
hands. The task was effectively an intermanual two-alternative
forced choice version of Kinsbourne and Warrington’s [12] ‘in-
between task’. Although there are more possible combinations (i.e.
patterns of stimulation) requiring the response ‘different’ than the
response ‘same’, we employed a selection of stimuli having
‘different’ as correct response, so that both responses were
represented in a similar proportion within each block. We also
ensured that the majority of possible finger pairs were represented.
This allowed us to classify each trial according to the degree of
homology, or number of fingers in common, to both hands. When
the same fingers were touched on both hands, there was total
homology, or 2 fingers in common between hands. When different
fingers were touched on both hands, there was no homology,o rn o
fingers in common between hands. When one particular finger
was stimulated on both left and right hands, but the other fingers
differed between the hands, there was partial homology, or 1 finger in
common (Fig. 1). 256 trials were presented in pseudo-random
Body Structure Representation
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blocks. The total homology trials were repeated across the two
blocks (because of the limited number of patterns available), while
no homology and partial homology trials presented in block 1 were
structurally identical in the two blocks, but the allocation of
stimulation to hands was reversed between blocks. Effects of
repetition of identical items (which might have produced a
spurious advantage for the total homology trials) were discarded
by comparing performance between blocks. Since we found no
effects or interactions involving block (Fs,1), we pooled data
across blocks. Stimuli for each block and principle of classification
are reported in Table S1.
Experiment 2 – Intermanual Delay
12 new subjects (mean age: 23; range: 18–45; 10F) participated.
Details were based on Experiment 1, except that in half the trials a
delay of 3 s was inserted between stimulation onsets of the two
hands. The order of stimulation was randomised. Subjects
responded whether the number of untouched fingers in between
was the same on the two hands, or not, as before. Since we wished
subjects to retain a bodily representation during the delay, rather
than immediately recoding the distance between the first two
touched fingers into a purely numerical form, we also included
20% of randomly intermingled trials in which subjects were
prompted whether any of the fingers touched was common to both
hands. These ‘any same fingers?’ trials always involved either no or
partial homology, so were never ambiguous (see Table S2). Each
subject performed 324 trials, spread across 4 blocks, in pseudo-
random order.
Experiment 3 – Generalisation across tactile judgement
tasks
6 subjects (mean age: 35; range: 28;51; 3F) took part with the
permission of the University of Trento ethical committee. Stimuli
were based on those for experiment 2. However, they were
delivered by computer-controlled piezoelectric stimulators
(Quaerosys, Stuttgart, Germany), rather than manually. Stimula-
tors transducer voltage controlled displacements of a piezo crystal
into protrusion or retraction of a plastic pin (ø 1 mm, maximal
skin indentation 1.2 mm). The devices gave a brief buzz-like
vibration to the stimulated digits (20 Hz). Stimulus intensity could
be systematically varied by controlling the amplitude of the skin
indentation. The same stimulus intensity was applied to the two
fingers on each hand, but the stimuli were more intense on one
hand than on the other. The experiment comprised two tasks. The
intermanual in-between task used the same piezoelectric stimula-
tion as the intensity task, but was otherwise designed as in
Experiment 2. In this task, intensity was irrelevant. In a separate
counterbalanced section of the experiment, participants judged
which hand was more intensely stimulated. In this task, both the
location of the fingers stimulated, and the number of untouched
fingers in between was irrelevant. The two intensities of the
experiment were chosen individually such that performance rates
were similar in both tasks. Critically, in the intensity task,
numerical coding would not facilitate performance. Moreover,
the task was purely sensory in nature, and made no reference to
body structural coding. After individually adjusting the difference
between stimulation intensities to obtain the same level of accuracy
in the two tasks, half the subjects performed the in-between task
Figure 1. Example of stimuli and main variables of interest. Green dots on fingers indicate sites of stimulation. A No fingers in-between on
either hand: a ‘same’ answer is required. Full homology is present, therefore this pattern is classified as a ‘total homology’ trial. B One finger in-
between on either hand: a ‘same’ answer is required. No homology is present, therefore this pattern is classified as a ‘no homology’ trial. C One finger
in-between on the left hand, two fingers in-between on the right hand: a ‘different’ answer is required. Inter-manual distance is given by the absolute
difference between the number of fingers in-between on the two hands, and is equal to 1 for this pattern. D Two fingers in-between on the left hand,
no fingers in-between on the right hand: a ‘different’ answer is required. Partial homology is present, since the index finger of both hands is
stimulated, therefore this pattern is classified as a ‘partial homology’ trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005418.g001
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performed the intensity task, and finally by another block of 60
trials in the in-between task. The other half was assigned the
complementary order of tasks, always following an ABBA design.
Experiment 4 – Effect of Hand Posture
The design and procedure were largely based on Experiment 1.
Sixteen new subjects (mean age: 26; range: 19–60; 10 female)
participated, with the permission of UCL ethics committee, in four
blocked conditions generated by orthogonally varying the posture
of each hand to be palm-downwards or palm-upwards (Fig. 2). In
the palm-downwards conditions, stimulation was as in experiment
1. In the palm-upwards conditions, stimulation was delivered to
the distal phalanx, on the pad of the finger. Care was taken to keep
the hand flat in the palm-up condition.
Results
Experiment 1 – The Intermanual In-Between Task
A repeated measures ANOVA on percentage of accuracy with
the factor homology (total, partial, none) revealed a significant
effect of number of fingers in common (Fig. 3A: F(2,18)=19.95,
p,.0001, g
2=689). Follow-up t-testing showed the total homol-
ogy condition to differ significantly from partial homology
(t(9)=4.54, p=.0014, d=1.435) and no homology (t(9)=5.66,
p=.0003, d=1.791), which in turn did not differ significantly from
each other (t,1). We reasoned that overall ANOVA might include
a response bias, since total homology trials necessarily require the
response ‘same’, while no homology and partial homology trials
required the response ‘different’ 43% and 76% of the times
respectively. We therefore analysed the subset of trials requiring
the response ‘same’ in each condition. This showed a similar
result, with total homology performance again significantly better
than partial and no homology (Figure 3B: mean(se) 88%(3%),
73%(6%), and 65%(6%) respectively, F(2,18)=24.02, p,.0001;
total vs partial homology: t(9)=4.11 p=.003, d=1.298; total vs no
homology: t(9)=5.84, p=.0002, d=1.847).
The intermanual in-between task requires participants to
compare information between the hemispheres, but does not
reveal the nature of the information compared. Performance on no
homology trials, however, cannot depend on sensory comparison
alone. We investigated whether performance varied as a function
Figure 2. Example trials with postures adopted in Experiment 4. As in Figure 1, green dots on fingers indicate sites of stimulation. Panels A
and E exemplify blocks in which both hands were kept by participants in a similar posture (either on their back or on their palm) and are therefore
labelled as congruent condition. Panels F and G exemplify blocks in which one hand was on the palm and the other on the back and are therefore
labelled as incongruent condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005418.g002
Figure 3. Mean percentage of correct responses for Experiment
1. Vertical bars indicate standard error of the mean. A Effect of
homology over all trials (i.e. both ‘same’ and ‘different’ responses; with
total homology, however, correct responses were always ‘same’). B
Effect of homology for ‘same’ trials only.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005418.g003
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hands for the no homology trials alone. Note that this ‘difference
value’ is independent of which actual fingers are touched, and (for
difference values 1 and 2) is also independent of the number of
fingers in between on each hand. For example, a difference value
of 1 could arise from in-between values on the two hands of 0 and
1, 1 and 2, or 2 and 3). This showed a clear monotonic sigmoidal
function, with worst performance when the numbers of in-between
fingers were identical and best performance when the number of
in-between fingers were maximally different (Figure 4:
F(3,27)=14.10, p,.0001, g
2=.689). We also performed a
planned comparison restricted to difference values of 1 and 2, to
give an indication of the perceptual dimension independent of
specific stimulus and response values (difference values of 3
necessarily involve thumb and little finger stimulation, while
difference values of 0 necessarily require the response ‘same’). This
comparison was significant (t(9)=3.11, p=0.012, d=0.982). This
result suggests that some dimension of body structure specifying
the number of in between fingers, but independent of any
particular sensory input or response can be compared across
hemispheres.
Experiment 2 – Intermanual Delay
The data from the in-between trials are shown in figure 5A, and
were entered in a repeated measures ANOVA with homology (no,
partial, total homology) and delay (no delay, 3-s delay) as factors.
The effect of homology closely replicated Experiment 1
(F(2,22)=12.29, p,.001, g
2=.524). Inter-manual delay signifi-
cantly improved performance (F(1,11)=32.90, p,.001,
g
2=.749). Finally, there was a significant interaction
(F(2,14)=7.10, p=.014, g
2=.392; Greenhouse-Geisser correct-
ed), with the benefit of delay being significant for partial and no
homology trials (t(11)=5.99, p,.0001, d=1.684 and t(11)=5.83,
p=.0001, d=1.730) but not for total homology trials (t,1).
Performance on the ‘any fingers in common?’ trials is shown in
figure 5B. There were significant effects of homology
(F(1,11)=25.36, p=.002, g
2=.697), of delay (F(1,11)=14.67,
p,.001, g
2=.571) and a significant interaction between homol-
ogy and delay (F(1,11)=5.78, p=.035, g
2=.586). The main effect
of delay again showed that intermanual delays improved
performance. The sensory codes required to identify whether
there was no or partial homology must therefore have been
retained over the delay period. Moreover, subjects could not
predict whether a given stimulation would be followed by an ‘any
common fingers’ judgement or an in-between judgement.
Therefore, we can assume that subject did not simply discard
sensory information, and retain only numerically recoded
information about inter-finger distance. Information in a somatic
form must have remained available in both tasks. The evidence
from the two tasks together suggests that the in-between task
involved either sensory or structural comparison, according to the
number of fingers in common on the two hands.
Experiment 3 – Generalisation across tactile judgement
tasks
The accuracy results were analysed using repeated measures
ANOVA with factors of task (in-between, intensity), homology
(none, total, partial), and delay (no delay, intermanual delay). The
results followed the pattern of Experiments 1 and 2, with the
familiar effects of homology (F(2,10)=6.907, p=0.014, g
2=.598),
delay (F(1,5)=9.302, p=0.028, g
2=.650) and an interaction
(F(2,10)=5.541, p=0.024, g
2=.529). There was no main effect of
task (p.0.125). Critically, there was no hint of any interaction
involving task (all Fs,1): the effects of homology and delay were
similar in the intensity and in-between tasks (Fig. 6).
Experiment 4 – Effect of Hand Posture
The results are shown in figure 7. ANOVA revealed the familiar
effect of number of fingers in common (F(1,15)=34.23, p,.001,
g
2=.695), a highly significant effect of congruence
(F(1,15)=14.00, p=.002, g
2=.483), and a significant interaction
(F(1,15)=4.74, p=.016, g
2=.241). Follow-up simple effect testing
showed that the interaction occurred because total homology trials
Figure 4. Response curve for the absolute inter-manual in-
between difference. Vertical bars indicate standard error of the
mean. Note that when the difference is zero, ‘same’ responses are
required, when it is greater than zero, ‘different’ responses are required.
A difference of 3 is given by a very limited number of patterns.
Therefore only differences of 1 and 2 should be taken into account
when testing the effect of inter-manual in-between distance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005418.g004
Figure 5. Mean percentage of correct responses for Experiment
2. Vertical bars indicate standard error of the mean. Continuous lines
indicate trials in which touches were given simultaneously on both
hands, dotted lines indicate trials in which a 3-s offset was present
between touches on the two hands. A Effect of homology in the in-
between task. B Effect of homology in the ‘any fingers in common?’
task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005418.g005
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while partial and no homology trials were not (total homology:
t(15)=3.40, p=.0039, d=.851; partial and no homology: ts,1).
Discussion
The in-between task has a long history as a measure of body
structure [12,19]. A correct response requires firstly identifying
which fingers are touched, and secondly locating the touched
fingers within a structural model of the hand that represents at
least the touched fingers and the untouched fingers in between
them. In Experiment 1 our intermanual version allowed us to
dissociate the sensory identification and structural representation
components of the classic in-between task. Specifically, the
structural component is unnecessary in the total homology
condition, because sensory homology is sufficient to determine
the response. We attribute the performance decrement in the
partial and no homology conditions relative to total homology as
reflecting the additional, presumably difficult, computations
involving body structural representation. Interestingly, we found
no difference between 1-common and 0-common conditions:
when a BSR was required, the degree of sensory homology seemed
irrelevant. This result is consistent with the sensory and structural
stages of the task being independent [20].
The similar performance for no and partial homology trials also
rules out explanations based on facilitation or interference between
purely sensory codes. On that interpretation, performance in
partial homology should lie between no homology and total
homology conditions, since both facilitation and interference show
classic ‘‘dose-response’’ relations. Our intermanual version also
allowed us to investigate the principles of organisation of the BSR.
Specifically, we found that the BSR contains information about
the number of untouched in-between fingers. This information
can be linked to current sensory input from the touched fingers,
and can moreover be shared between the hemispheres.
In Experiment 2 an intermanual delay improved performance
on our in-between task. We attribute this main effect to the
difficulty of perceiving and localising several simultaneous touches.
Tactile detection and pattern perception both fall off rapidly as the
number of simultaneous touches increases above two [21,22]. Our
simultaneous condition required participants to localise four
simultaneous touches, while the delayed condition required them
to localise just two simultaneous touches. Delay thus improved
performance by making the identification of each tactile pattern
easier. Interestingly, however, this benefit was present only with
partial and no homology trials and not with total homology trials.
In other words, the representation used for partial and no
homology conditions either decays less rapidly, or indeed becomes
more elaborated through the delay interval, whereas the initial
relative advantage of the total homology condition would be based
on the immediate availability of primary somatosensory codes,
which are sufficient to perform the task in that condition only.
Such information, however, would also decay very rapidly, and
the advantage of total homology disappears once participants
cannot exploit any more the ‘‘somatosensory shortcut’’. This fits
the common observation that BSRs are relatively enduring, and
outlast immediate sensory inputs. An alternative account might
attribute the pattern of performance on total homology trials
either to improved transcallosal facilitation in the simultaneous
condition, or to slower decay of bilaterally homologous sensory
codes in the delayed condition. However, such purely sensory
accounts would again predict partial homology performance
intermediate between the other conditions, which was not the
case.
Experiment 3 showed that the detrimental effects of non-
homology, and the beneficial effects of intermanual delay, were
equally present for in-between and intensity comparisons. In
principle, in-between tasks might be solved by simply converting
structural information into a purely numerical code, and then
comparing numerical values, without reference to body structure.
However, this strategy would be of no value in judgements of a
primary sensory dimension such as intensity. The pattern of results
was nevertheless very similar for the two tasks. This makes it less
Figure 6. Mean percentage of correct responses for Experiment
3. Vertical bars indicate standard error of the mean). Continuous lines
indicate trials in which touches were given simultaneously on both
hands, dotted lines indicate trials in which a random 3-to-5-s offset was
present between touches on the two hands. A Effect of homology in
the intensity task. B Effect of homology in the in-between task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005418.g006
Figure 7. Mean percentage of correct responses for Experiment
4. Vertical bars indicate standard error of the mean). Continuous lines
indicate trials in which hands were kept in an congruent posture,
dotted lines indicate trials in which hands were kept in an incongruent
posture. Patterns of touches were identical in the two conditions (i.e.
the same combinations of fingers were stimulated, irrespective of
posture).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005418.g007
Body Structure Representation
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to a special task-specific coding strategy, such as number
representation.
The intensity task of Experiment 3 also showed the hallmark
effects of delay and homology. Thus, the characteristic effects
associated with body structure representation coding were also
present in purely implicit intensity task, which referred only to
current stimulation, and did not refer explicitly to representation
of untouched digits or position of stimulated digits within the
hand. These results suggest that BSRs may be automatically
activated by the tactile input, even when not necessary for the task.
Simply judging attributes of tactile stimuli delivered to the fingers
may automatically situate those stimuli within the body structure.
Alternatively, could the results of Experiment 3 be explained by
a change in the neural representation of touch with increasing
delays? Harris et al [1] asked participants to discriminate two
vibration frequencies. The two vibrations could be delivered either
to the same finger, or shifted by 1 or 2 fingers between the first and
second vibration. The inter-stimulus interval (ISI) was varied. For
short ISIs, the results showed a clear topographic tuning, with
performance declining as the shift between stimuli increased from
0t o+1t o+2. When the ISI was increased, however, performance
for +1 shifted stimuli increased to the same level as repeated
stimulation of the same finger. This pattern of results is consistent
with a gradual recoding of tactile information into a representation
with a broader, less spatially-precise topographic organization,
possibly corresponding to secondary somatosensory cortex. A
similar recoding could, in principle contribute to the reduction in
homology effects with delay in our intensity judgement task.
However, we think this is unlikely for two reasons. First, in our
task, participants are stimulated simultaneously on two fingers,
whereas Harris’ task involved stimulation of one digit at a time.
The perceived intensity of stimulation to each hand therefore
presumably already involves integrating over a broad region of
somatotopic space, even before any intermanual comparison.
Therefore, the normal retention of a single stimulus in high-acuity
topographic cortex [23] over short intervals may play a lesser role
in our task than in Harris et al’s.. Second, we found no evidence
that trials in which the same pattern was presented on both hands
with a shift of 1 or 2 fingers showed any effects of shift size, nor any
interaction between shift size and delay.
Experiment 4 confirmed a dissociation between spatial coding
for total homology and other trials. The purely sensory codes
assumed to underlie total homology performance were strongly
affected by the congruence of the two hands’ postures. This may
seem paradoxical, since those sensory codes may correspond to
early cortical representations such as the SI homunculus.
However, several studies show that tactile detection and
localisation are sensitive to external spatial aspects, such as hand
position. The anatomical frame of reference of early sensory cortex
is very rapidly recoded into external spatial coordinates [6]
producing spatial congruence effects [18]. In contrast, the
representations compared across the hands in partial and no
homology were quite different, since they were independent of
hand posture. In this sense, the BSR underlying partial and no
homology judgements seems to be a representation of the hand
that is independent of hand location and orientation. This suggests
that the spatial organisation of the BSR is not only somatic (tied to
specific body parts), but also allocentric (independent of the
location and orientation of those parts).
In summary, we adapted a classic finger gnosis task, the in-
between task, to investigate how information about body structure
is represented and communicated between hemispheres. Subjects
reported whether the number of untouched fingers in-between two
touched fingers was the same on both hands, or not. The inter-
manual version of the task allowed us to dissociate, for the first
time, the sensory aspects of finger gnosis, i.e., localising the tactile
stimulation within a primary sensory map, from the representa-
tional aspects, i.e., linking the stimulation to a structural
representation of the hand. This representation would specify
the number, order and arrangement of the fingers. In the classical,
unimanual version of the task, these two processing stages cannot
be clearly separated. We reliably found better inter-manual
performance when homologous fingers were touched on both
hands (‘total homology’ trials), compared to partial homology or
no homology between hands. Further analyses suggested this was
due to an additional computational stage representing number and
order of fingers in-between, rather than mere overlap between
sensory codes. We therefore proposed that a body structure
representation (BSR) is used to compare tactile patterns across
different body parts when sensory homology alone cannot be used.
In further experiments, we confirmed the dissociation between
sensory and structural representations on the basis of their time
course (Experiment 2) and spatial frame of reference (Experiment
4). We also suggested that representation of the body used in the
in-between task was also recruited for other intermanual sensory
comparisons, in which digit representation is implicit and
irrelevant (Experiment 3). The BSR was found to be long-lasting
and posture-independent, relative to purely sensory representa-
tions.
What kind of information is processed in the intermanual in-
between task? Clearly, at least a representation of body structure
specifying the number of untouched fingers is necessary for the
task. One might then ask whether the comparison between the two
hands retains any body-specific content, or is a purely abstract
numerical code. In Experiment 2, we showed that the character-
istic pattern of homology effects remained even when rapid
recoding into numerical form was discouraged by forcing
participants to retain information about which specific fingers
were touched for a randomly-interleaved task. Therefore, we
suggest that an intermediate body-structural code is used between
the original tactile sensation and the intermanual comparison.
However, purely behavioural work cannot identify the precise
nature of this code, or show how abstract it is. Future
neuroimaging work might localize purely sensory tactile represen-
tations, and the abstract representations involved in numerical
comparison, and then assess the degree of activation of each in the
intermanual in-between task. Interestingly, body-structure and
number codes seem to be closely associated in the brain. For
example, Gerstmann’s syndrome following left parietal damage
involves both dyscalculia and finger agnosia. Therefore, our
suggestion of an intermediate structural representation leading
naturally to number codes may be consistent with the represen-
tational principles of the brain.
Our results provide a novel behavioural proof of the existence of
a second level of body representation in the human brain. Studies
of early sensory cortex reported somatotopic maps of tactile inputs
[24]. Several areas of parietal association cortex rapidly remap
these inputs into the external, egocentric spatial coordinates used
for immediate motor control [25]. BSRs, in contrast, represent
parts of the body that are not currently stimulated, and were
dissociated from tactile sensory codes by our experimental
manipulations. In particular, BSRs did not decay across time,
were independent of hand posture, and appeared to be recruited
automatically for intermanual comparison, even when not
explicitly elicited by the task. In contrast, sensory representations
are confined to the period of stimulation, and are linked to specific
locations in somatotopic maps and in external space. Interestingly,
Body Structure Representation
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cy, and also to the sense of self. We suggest that the ability to form
BSRs may represent an important cognitive and evolutionary step.
A creature with a mind capable of BSR represents itself as a
physical object with constancies like other physical objects. This
may be an important precursor of self-awareness [26].
Our data also clarify several properties of the BSR. First, it can
be compared across hemispheres. This implies an important
cognitive operation of relational thinking or abstraction that is not
captured by the classic in-between task. For example, someone
who responds correctly to the stimulus of figure 1B must represent
that the relation between fingers 2 and 4 (i.e., that they are
separated by one in-between finger) is the same as the relation
between fingers 3 and 5. The BSR therefore contains at least
ordinal representations. BSRs also support the concept of two
relations being similar even when the elements that are related are
dissimilar, as in the example above. This relational quality
represents an important stage of abstraction from purely sensory
representations.
Finally, our behavioural results are strongly consistent with
neuropsychological literature on body representation. Left hemi-
sphere damage, notably to the angular gyrus, affects finger gnosis
[12]. Our results show that, if the task is made sufficiently difficult,
normal subjects make similar errors to patients. More generally,
autotopagnosic patients show deficits in ordinal, magnitude and
relational aspects of body representation. For example, when
asked to point to their wrist, they may point to the shoulder or
elbow [27]. On this evidence, Sirigu, Grafman, Bressler and
Sunderland [28] proposed a structural representation specifying
the spatial arrangement of different body parts relative to each
other. Our data strongly supports this view, since the order of
finger arrangement is a key structural feature of the hand.
Crucially, our data shows the representation of body structure
involves coding principles distinct from those used in early, sensory
levels of somatosensory processing.
Supporting Information
Table S1 All 100 experimental items are shown, 30 of which
require a ‘same’ response, and 70 a ‘different’ response. Fingers
are both number-coded. An ‘x’ in a column indicates that a tactile
stimulus was delivered on the corresponding finger. Two
experimental blocks were created with such items, one containing
the 30 ‘same’ trials and half (i.e. 35) of the ‘different’ trials.
Division of the ‘different’ trials in two halves was made in a way
that configurations within each half were the mirror image of
configurations in the other half. This was made to counterbalance
the identity of stimulated fingers and overall difficulty between the
two blocks of 65 trials (30 ‘same’ +35 ‘different’). In Experiment 1,
each of the two blocks was repeated twice in a counterbalanced
order, making up a total of 260 trials. Ibt L=number of fingers in
between the stimulated fingers on the left hand; Ibt R=number of
fingers in between the stimulated fingers on the right hand;
Common=number of homologous fingers that are stimulated on
the two hands. Supplementary Table 2 - The same structure as for
Experiment 1 was maintained with the following exceptions: a) for
half the items reported in Summary Table 1 stimulation was given
simultaneously on the two hands, for the other half it was given
with a delay of 3 s between hands (half the times starting with the
left hand, the other half starting with the right hand); b) 32
additional trials were included in the experimental blocks (see
below; 16 for each block that was repeated twice, as in Experiment
1, making up a total of 64 additional trials on the whole
experiment), in which participants were asked to report whether
the stimulated fingers were homologous or not. In half of these
trials, stimulation occurred simultaneously on the two hands, in
the other half it occurred with a 3-s delay between hands (half the
times starting with the left hand).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005418.s001 (0.32 MB
DOC)
Table S2 The same structure as for Experiment 1 was
maintained with the following exceptions: a) for half the items
reported in Summary Table 1 stimulation was given simulta-
neously on the two hands, for the other half it was given with a
delay of 3 s between hands (half the times starting with the left
hand, the other half starting with the right hand); b) 32 additional
trials were included in the experimental blocks (see below; 16 for
each block that was repeated twice, as in Experiment 1, making up
a total of 64 additional trials on the whole experiment), in which
participants were asked to report whether the stimulated fingers
were homologous or not. In half of these trials, stimulation
occurred simultaneously on the two hands, in the other half it
occurred with a 3-s delay between hands (half the times starting
with the left hand).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005418.s002 (0.12 MB
DOC)
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